"America Has Faced the Unknown Since 1776," so says Warren Buffett

April 17, 2013

“America Has Faced the Unknown Since 1776”

So wrote Warren Buffett in his March 1, 2013 letter to Berkshire Hathaway Inc. stockholders. In the phrase before this quote, Mr. Buffett wrote: “Of course, the immediate future is uncertain …” And after this quote, he wrote: “It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).” I bring this up because ever since early-fall 2012, there has been a Greek chorus of economists appearing in the mainstream media warning us about various uncertainties from the fiscal cliffs of Washington D.C. to the banking whirlpools of Cyprus. These uncertainties were supposed to freeze the purchasing decisions of businesses and households alike, threatening to plunge the U.S. economy back into recession.

Presumably because of this uncertainty, economists were relatively pessimistic about the U.S. economy’s growth prospects for the first quarter of 2013. Back in October 2012, the consensus forecast for real GDP growth in Q1:2013 was 1.7%. Now, it is 2.9% -- not spectacular but a lot better than the previous quarter’s growth of 0.4%. The U.S. data that have been released for Q1:2013 so far suggest that the only sector whose purchasing decisions have been “frozen” is that of the government. Growth in consumer spending appears to have accelerated and the strong growth in business capital spending that occurred at the end of 2012 appears to have continued in the first quarter of 2013.

Like the poor, uncertainty will always be with us. Something else that is now with us, but won’t always be, is the rapid expansion in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Back in the fall of 2012, the Fed announced that it intended to expand its balance sheet by approximately $85 billion per month, which works out to $1.2 trillion per year. What is different about this round of Fed credit creation is that, in contrast to previous rounds, the private banking system also is creating credit. Historically, an acceleration in the sum of Fed and bank credit has been associated with an acceleration in domestic spending. So, the uncertainty investors should be most concerned about is how the Fed manages its balance sheet going forward. Will the Fed terminate the expansion of its balance sheet too early or too late? Right now, it appears to be managing its balance sheet “just right” for investors in risk assets and for economic growth, which is trumping all the other uncertainties, real or imagined, that the talking heads keep warning you about in the mainstream media. I don’t know about you, but I think uncertainty is the last refuge of economist scoundrels who don’t have a clue about what drives the cyclical behavior of the economy and asset markets.

Paul L. Kasriel

Econtrarian, LLC

econtrarian@gmail.com

1-920-818-0236

http://www.the-econtrarian.blogspot.com

Ben Bernanke, the Rodney Dangerfield of Fed Chairmen

April 3, 2013

Ben Bernanke, the Rodney Dangerfield of Fed Chairmen

First it was 2012 presidential candidate Rick Perry, who wanted to deal with Ben Bernanke’s money-printing “Texas style”. Then 2012 presidential candidate Mitt Romney indicated that Ben Bernanke had better have his personal effects packed up and ready to move out of his Fed office by January 21, 2013. And now it is David Stockman, who is mad as Hell and won’t take it anymore (see Mr. Stockman’s rant in the March 31, 2013 op-ed section of the New York Times, “Sundown in America”), the money printing of the Federal Reserve under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke being included in “it”. Similar to the late Rodney Dangerfield, Ben Bernanke just can’t get no respect.

I actually agree with much of the political-economic criticism vented by Mr. Stockman in his Times

op-ed.  Yes, government spending has expanded too much in the past four decades. And, to the point of my rant here, the Fed’s printing press was running too fast during most of the past four decades. When Fed Chairman Greenspan was being described as a monetary-policy maestro by Bob Woodward, yours truly was describing him more like the pied piper of Hamelin. And yes, when Ben Bernanke was a mere governor of the Federal Reserve Board under Greenspan’s chairmanship, he never once publicly dissented from Greenspan’s bubblicious policies. But let he who is without sin cast the first stone, Mr. “Supply-Side” Stockman. I believe in redemption. And I believe that the money-printing that Ben Bernanke oversaw after the failure of Lehman Brothers was and continues to be entirely appropriate unless a recession on the order of magnitude of that of 1929-1933 would have been viewed as desirable.

Let me begin my defense of Ben Bernanke’s Fed chairmanship post Lehman. Chart 1 shows the year-over-year percent changes in quarterly observations of the loans, leases and securities on the books of depository institutions – commercial banks, savings institutions and credit unions – from Q1:1960 through Q4:2012. The median year-over-year percent change in depository institution credit from 1960 through 2007, the year before Lehman failed, was 8.4%, as represented by the height of the horizontal red line in Chart 1. (As an aside, Mr. Stockman might want to take into consideration that the Reagan supply-side miracle might not have been so miraculous had it not been for the surge depository institution credit that coincided with it. Was it marginal tax-rate cuts or rapid growth in depository institution credit that worked economic miracles?)

But I digress. Notice that from 1960 through 2012, there have been only two occasions in which the change in depository institution credit was negative. The first occasion was in the early 1990s, at the time of the S&L crisis. You may recall that the economic recovery that started in the spring of 1991 was the first “jobless” recovery in the post-WWII era for the U.S. The second occasion in which depository institution credit contracted commenced in 2009, soon after the Lehman failure. The contraction in depository institution credit was more severe in the second occasion than the first.  As I have discussed in previous commentaries, reasonable people can disagree as to what the optimum rate of growth in depository institution should be and the 1960 – 2007 median growth of 8.4% might not be the optimum, but I would argue that a contraction in depository institution credit is sub-optimum. And that is what we were experiencing for the most of 2009, 2010 and 2011. At 3.4% year-over-year growth in Q4:2012, this remains a tepid increase in depository credit in the context of the past 50-plus years.

Chart 1

Enter the quantitative policies of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke. Chart 2 shows the year-over-year percent changes of quarterly observations in Federal Reserve credit, here measured by the monetary base. The monetary base represents the cash reserves held by depository institutions and the currency held by the public, both of which are created by the Fed figuratively out of thin air. (This measure of the monetary base does not include the loans advanced to AIG following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.) When Mr. Stockman and others refer to the Federal Reserve’s money-printing operations, they are referring to the behavior of the monetary base. From 1960 through 2007, the median year-over-year change in the monetary base was 6.1%. From 1960 through 2008, the largest year-over-year change in the monetary base was 12.6% in Q4:1999, as the Fed greatly enlarged the amount of currency available to the public and depository institutions to accommodate the increased precautionary demand for such in anticipation of problems that might arise in connection with Y2K. (I still have tins of kippers that, to the amusement of my family, I stockpiled in December 2009.) But that 12.6% year-over-year increase in the monetary base pales in comparison with the 107.9% increase in Q2:2009. From the end of 2008 through the beginning of 2012, the monetary base has, with one quarterly exception, grown far above its 1960-2007 median rate of 6.1%.

Chart 2

Horrors? Perhaps not. Credit evaluation and political issues aside, there is no macroeconomic difference between the Fed providing credit and the depository institution system providing credit. Both create the credit they extend figuratively out of thin air. Thus, when either extends new credit, the recipient of that credit can increase its current spending and no other entity need decrease its current spending. When the Fed purchases Treasury securities in the open market, the cry goes up in some circles that the Fed is monetizing the public debt. Yet, if the depository institution system purchases Treasury securities, monetization alarm bells do not go off even though the macroeconomic impact is the same. When the depository institution system increases its net credit extension by granting more home mortgages, why don’t we hear that private debt is being monetized? In a sense, the depository institution system is an intermediary between the Federal Reserve and ultimate borrowers in the economy. Again, credit evaluation and political issues aside, in theory, the Fed could cut out the middleman, the depository institution system, and directly grant home mortgages, car loans and business loans to the private sector along with creating credit for government entities. What I am getting at here is that the sum of Fed and depository institution credit is what Mr. Stockman should be concerned with, not Fed credit in isolation.

Chart 3 shows the year-over-year percent changes in depository institution credit and the sum of depository institution credit and Federal Reserve credit (the monetary base) from Q1:1960 through Q4:2012. From 1960 through 2008, percent changes in the sum of Fed and depository institution credit and depository institution credit by itself does not differ much. It is starting in 2009 when the divergence in growth rates is magnified. For example, in Q2:2009, depository institution credit contracted by 0.5%, whilst the sum of depository institution credit and Fed credit grew by 7.0%. Recall, it was in Q2:2009 that Fed credit by itself grew year-over-year by 107.9%. Scary in isolation; not so scary when looked at in combination with depository institution credit. Fed credit began to explode in Q4:2008 after Lehman imploded. Yet, from Q4:2008 through Q4:2012, the latest complete data, there has not been one quarter in which year-over-year growth in the sum of Fed and depository institution credit has reached or exceeded the 1960-2007 median growth rate of 8.4% for depository institution credit by itself. In fact, from Q3:2008 through Q4:2012, the compound annual rate of growth in the sum of Fed and depository institution credit has been a mere 3.6%. During this same 17-quarter period, the compound annual rate of growth in depository institution credit by itself was 0.4%. Can you imagine how weak the pace in economic activity would have been post-Lehman had the Fed not sped up its “printing press”?

Chart 3

I suppose Mr. Stockman would have preferred the Fed’s policy in the early 1930s to Ben Bernanke’s. The Fed did speed up its “printing press” after the stock market crash of October 1929, but not nearly enough to offset the contraction in depository institution credit that took place. Chart 4 shows the year-over-year percent change in depository institution credit, Fed credit and the sum of depository institution credit and Fed credit for the semi-annual periods from 1929 through 1941. The shaded areas indicate periods of recession. Notice that during the 1929 – 1933 recession, there was an acceleration in the growth of Federal Reserve credit, but not enough to prevent the sum of Fed and depository institution credit from contracting. In the four years ended the first half of 1933, the sum of Fed and depository institution credit contracted at a compound annual rate of 7.5%. In that same time period, depository institution credit by itself contracted at a compound annual rate of 9.0%. The rebound in depository institution credit starting in the first half of 1934, which corresponded to a vigorous economic recovery, was due to several factors. The Banking Act of 1933 established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This greatly reduced the threat of runs on banks by depositors, which, in turn, reduced banks’ liquidity demand, enabling them to increase their lending. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, established in early 1932, helped recapitalize the banking system, again enabling banks to increase their lending. And the Fed increased bank reserves, the “seed money” that the banking system could multiply into a greater amount of bank lending. The sharp spike in the growth of Fed credit/bank reserves that started in the first half of 1934 was related to President Roosevelt’s decision to raise the dollar price of gold – something that Mr. Stockman still is angry about. In 1936, the Fed began its exit strategy from its accommodative policy. From the middle of 1936 to the middle of 1937, the Federal Reserve began to “sterilize” some of the reserves that it had created earlier by doubling the percentage of cash reserves banks were required to hold against their deposits. This caused banks to contract their credit outstanding and the Fed did not offset this bank credit contraction with Fed credit expansion. This helped bring on the 1937 – 1938 recession.

Chart 4

In sum, I would argue that the “money printing” that Fed Chairman Bernanke engaged in after the failure of Lehman Brothers was entirely appropriate if the U.S. were to avoid a recession of the magnitude of that of 1929 – 1933. The Fed was merely creating some credit that only partially offset the contraction in depository institution credit. Despite the rapid growth in the Fed’s balance sheet starting in late 2008, combined Fed and depository institution credit has been growing at a subdued pace when compared with its behavior in the past 50 years. So, for now, let’s show Ben Bernanke some respect for how he has managed monetary policy after the Lehman failure. I have a hunch that there might be legitimate grounds to criticize the Fed chairman, whomever that might be, in the next few years as he or she executes the so-called exit strategy for monetary policy. If the exit strategy is not guided by the growth in the sum of depository institution and Fed credit, which by all indications it will not be, then policy mistakes will be made and Mr. Stockman can write another op-ed for the Times.

Paul L. Kasriel

Senior Economic and Investment Advisor

Legacy Private Trust Company of Neenah, Wisconsin

Econtrarian, LLC

econtrarian@gmail.com

1-920-818-0236

http://www.the-econtrarian.blogspot.com/

Why Not a Quantitative Target for Quantitative Easing?

March 20, 2013

Why Not a Quantitative Target for Quantitative Easing?

When I should have been practicing my bass guitar in preparation for my band class Thursday evening, I, instead, watched the first few minutes of Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke’s post-FOMC press conference. A number of press inquiries were related to adding specificity to the FOMC’s criteria for modifying its current $85 billion per-month purchases of securities. In the short time that I watched the press conference, Chairman Bernanke did not seem to satisfy the press on this issue. So, again, neglecting my bass guitar practice, to which I assure you, I should not neglect, I decided to write this commentary on how I would determine the management of a quantitative approach to monetary policy. I have no illusions that Chairman Bernanke will follow my suggestion. But I believe that by observing what the Fed actually does compared to my suggestion, investors can gain some valuable information as to the cyclical behavior of the economy and the cyclical behavior of riskier assets vs. less risky assets.

So, as Fareed Zakaria says on Sunday mornings, let’s get started. Plotted in Chart 1 is the relationship between the year-over-year percent change in nominal gross domestic purchases (not product) and the year-over-year percent change in total thin-air credit. If the chart looks familiar, it is an updated version of the Chart 1 I included in my February 5, 2013 tome, “The 2013 Economic Outlook – Bright Sunshine for the U.S., Periods of Cloud Abroad”. To refresh your memory, total thin-air credit is the sum of the credit extended by the Federal Reserve and the depository institution system, the latter of which is dominated by the commercial banking system. I refer to this credit as thin-air credit because it is credit that figuratively is created out of thin air, which enables its recipients to increase their current spending on goods/ services/ assets whilst not requiring its grantors or any other entity to cut back on their current spending. Hence, changes in thin-air credit, theoretically, should correlate highly with changes in total nominal spending in an economy. And this might be one of those rare cases where “ugly” facts do not spoil a “beautiful” theory. That is, from 1953 through 2007, the correlation between percent changes in total thin-air credit and percent changes in nominal gross domestic purchases – the aggregate nominal spending in the U.S. on currently-produced goods and services, be they goods and services produced in the U.S. or China, is 0.65 out of a possible maximum of 1.00. Why did I stop the correlation calculation at the end of 2007 rather than calculating it with data through the end of 2012? Because the correlation value would have fallen, detracting from my “beautiful” theory. Why would the correlation value have fallen? Because right after Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008, the Fed increased its balance sheet enormously, in part with loans to AIG and to foreign central banks, which also enlarged total thin-air credit. But because these Fed loans to AIG were, in effect, restoring some of AIG’s “depreciated” capital and because there were Fed loans of large dollar amounts to foreign central banks,  the increase in Fed loans and the resulting increase in total thin-air credit had no positive impact on domestic spending.

Chart 1

Why isn’t the correlation 1.00 between 1953 and 2007? Primarily because some of the spending by the recipients of thin-air credit is on previously-produced goods and services, e.g., used cars, used homes or, in my case, used sailboats, or spending on financial assets. So, if the Fed wanted to conduct monetary policy in a way that would result in some steady rate of growth in aggregate nominal domestic demand, post-WWII economic history suggests it could do worse than managing the amount of credit it extends so as to hit a target rate of growth in the sum of credit it extends and the credit banks and other depository institutions extend. Assume that the Fed believed that if the economy were operating at full employment, then annual growth in nominal gross domestic purchases of around 4% would maintain full employment, would keep consumer-price inflation around 2% annually and would prevent the inflation of asset-price bubbles. Further assume that, for whatever reason, credit being extended by depository institutions was only growing at 2% annually. Under the Paul Kasriel recommendation to Chairman Bernanke, the Fed would undertake the expansion of its balance sheet, primarily through the acquisition of securities from the market, such that the sum of Fed credit and depository institution credit was boosted to an annual rate of growth of 4%. Now assume, that the growth in depository institution credit accelerates from 2% annualized to 4%, which then results in the sum of Fed and depository institution credit now growing at 6% annualized. This would be a signal to the Fed to cut back on its purchases of securities such that the sum of Fed and depository institution credit slows in growth back down to a rate of 4% annualized.

How has the Fed managed its securities purchases in recent years compared with the Paul Kasriel approach? The Fed’s first conscious decision to concentrate on a quantity of securities purchases commenced in December 2008. This first securities-purchase program, which became known as quantitative easing (QE), lasted through the middle of third quarter of 2010. During this period, the Fed purchased approximately $1.725 trillion of various types and maturities of securities from the market. Shown in Chart 2 is the behavior of depository institution credit and total thin-air credit. Throughout most of this first securities- purchase program by the Fed, represented by the yellow shaded area QE I in Chart 2, depository institution credit was contracting. Early in the QE I period, there was unusually high growth in total thin-air credit due primarily due to massive extensions of Fed credit through various lending facilities such as the discount window, loans to foreign central banks and loans to AIG. Notice, however, by the fourth quarter of 2009, despite continued Fed securities purchases, total thin-air credit was contracting. The reasons for this contraction in total thin-air credit were the contraction in depository institution credit and the reduction in Fed credit through the Fed’s various lending facilities.

Chart 2

Also shown in Chart 2 for illustrative purposes is a series I have named Total Thin-Air Credit “Target”. I have defined the target rate of growth in total thin-air credit as the year-over-year percent change in CBO-estimated real potential GDP plus 2 percentage points. Presumably, once full employment in the economy were achieved, the Fed would desire that nominal GDP grow somewhere in the neighborhood of the rate of growth in real potential GDP with an annual inflation rate of 2 percent. The best and the brightest economists at the Fed could work out what the rate of growth in total thin-air credit would need to be in order to hit this nominal GDP growth target. Given that the 0.65 correlation between growth in total thin-air credit and nominal gross domestic purchases, I would assume that the target rate of growth in total thin-air credit as I have defined it would be a minimum target. Back to QE I. Starting in the third quarter of 2009 and for the remainder of the QE I period, growth in actual total thin-air credit was below my illustrative target rate of growth.

Now, on to QE II. This second round of securities purchases undertaken by the Fed started in the middle of the fourth quarter of 2010 and terminated at the end of the second quarter of 2011. The Fed purchased an additional $600 billion of securities during QE II. Given that other asset items on the Fed’s balance sheet were relatively constant during QE II and that the contraction in depository institution credit was of a smaller magnitude than it was during QE I, total thin-air credit grew throughout QE II and reached my illustrative target rate of growth by the end of
QE II.

Due to the resumption in growth of depository institution credit in the fourth quarter of 2011, total thin-air credit exceeded my illustrative target rate by about 1.6 percentage points. Thereafter, however, growth in total thin-air credit again dipped below my illustrative target rate, being about one percentage point below the target growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2012, the first full quarter of QE III.

The Fed will not release its first quarter 2013 flow-of-funds report, the source of total depository institution credit data, until June 6. But the Fed does release monthly bank credit data. Given that commercial bank credit now accounts for the bulk of depository institution credit, year-over-year percent changes in monthly bank credit are a close approximation for year-over-year percent changes in depository institution credit. Therefore, the year-over-year percent change in the sum of monthly bank credit and monthly Fed credit is a close approximation for the year-over-year percent changes in total thin-air credit. Year-over-year percent changes in monthly bank credit and the sum of bank and Fed credit are shown in Chart 3 through February 2013, the latest complete monthly data available. Also shown in Chart 3 is the illustrative target rate of growth for total thin-air credit. While year-over-year growth in bank credit is slowing, growth in the sum of bank and Fed credit is accelerating because of the resumption of Fed net asset purchases that commenced in mid September of 2012. In February 2013, year-over-year growth in the sum of Fed and bank credit had reached the illustrative target rate of growth of 3.8%.

Chart 3

Before we should hoist the “Mission Accomplished” banner for the Fed, we need to take into consideration that my illustrative target rate of growth for total thin-air credit is what the target the Fed might aim for as full employment is approached. No serious person, even the perennial FOMC hawks, would consider our current unemployment rate of 7.7% as anywhere close to full employment. Consider also that from 1953 through 2012, the median year-over-year growth in total thin-air credit was 7.25%. Acknowledging that 7.25% annual growth in thin-air credit was associated with some economic booms, still, with as much excess capacity that currently exists in the U.S. economy, 3.8% growth in total thin-air credit would appear to be rather anemic compared to this median rate of growth in total thin air credit.
But by this time in 2014, the situation could be much different. If the Fed were to hold to its current course of increasing its balance sheet by about $85 billion per month throughout 2013, this would represent a 7.1% increase in total thin-air credit in the fourth quarter of 2013 vs. 2012 assuming depository institution credit remained constant at its fourth-quarter 2012 level. Given that the capital positions of depository institutions in general are much improved, it is much more probable that depository institution credit will be rising in 2013 rather than remaining stagnant. Thus, unless the Fed soon cuts back on its securities purchases, growth in total thin-air credit is likely to be robust in 2013, which implies relatively robust growth in aggregate domestic spending on goods, services and assets.

I don’t expect the Fed to pay any heed to this commentary. But you might want to. If total thin-air credit continues to accelerate this year, it will be bullish for growth in U.S. economic activity and bullish for risk assets. If, by the end of 2013 or sooner, total thin-air credit is growing on a year-over-year basis at 7% or more, be prepared for U.S. bond yields of all stripes to have risen significantly in anticipation of Fed interest rate hikes well before 2015, when the majority of FOMC members now believe rate increases will commence.

Paul L. Kasriel
Senior Economic and Investment Adviser, Legacy Private Trust Co.
Econtrarian, LLC
http://www.the-econtrarian.blogspot.com/
Econtrarian@gmail.com
1-920-818-0236

The Real Economic Implications of Our Senior Entitlements Challenge

March 18, 2013

The Real Economic Implications of Our Senior Entitlements Challenge

Economics is art masquerading as science. Demographics is not only science, but destiny. Chart 1 shows the changing demographics of America. It shows the rising trend in the proportion of senior “takers” in America. Back in 1960, those U.S. residents aged 65 or over made up 9.2% of the total population. That percentage had risen to 13.1% by 2010 and is projected to move up rapidly in the coming decades, reaching 21.9% by 2060. I refer to this (my) age cohort as “takers” because most Americans in this age group retire from the workforce – stop “making” – and primarily just “take” or consume. The preparation, or lack thereof, for this significant increase in senior “takers” has important implications for the future long-term potential per capita growth of the U.S. economy.

Chart 1

My perception is that this changing demographic phenomenon is being discussed in the mainstream media primarily in terms of its impact on federal government spending. Indeed, the projected increase in the number of U.S. seniors will have important implications for federal government spending, more so on the composition of total spending than the growth in total spending. Chart 2 shows actual and CBO- baseline projected fiscal year-over-year percent changes in total federal government outlays from 1974 through 2023. Also shown in Chart 2 are the actual and CBO-baseline projected federal expenditures on senior entitlements – Social Security and Medicare – as a percentage of total federal outlays for the fiscal years 1973 through 2023. The senior entitlement spending is understated because it does not include Medicaid expenditures for senior nursing home care.

Chart 2

The projected median annual growth in total federal outlays in the fiscal years 2013 through 2023 is 5.5%. This is lower than the 6.1% annual median growth in total federal outlays in the fiscal years 1974 through 2012. So, projected growth in total federal outlays in an environment of a rising proportion of U.S. seniors is not extraordinary. As an aside, average annual growth in total federal outlays in the three fiscal years ended 2012 was 0.2%. So, the perception that federal government spending currently is excessive may hold for the absolute level, but not for its rate of growth in the past three fiscal years. But let us never allow facts to get in the way of opinions.

What is more noteworthy in Chart 2 than the projected annual rates of growth in total federal government spending is the rising percentage of that spending dedicated to senior entitlements. In fiscal year 1973, senior entitlements accounted for 24.4% of total federal outlays. By fiscal year 2012, this percentage had risen to 37.3% and is now projected by the CBO to rise further to 42.1% by fiscal year 2023. Assuming that there is a desire by the body politic to limit growth in total federal outlays, federal senior entitlement spending inexorably is “crowding out” other categories of federal government expenditures, for example, infrastructure, education and scientific research.  Now we are getting to the implication for future per capita economic growth as a result of the aging of America. To the degree that federal government spending on infrastructure, education and scientific research enhances productivity growth – and, to be sure, there is much disagreement as to this degree – then the crowding out of this federal spending by increased senior entitlement spending implies slower future per-capita growth in the U.S. economy.

Assuming it were politically feasible, could we mitigate the negative effect on future per capita economic growth emanating from increased federal spending on senior entitlements by simply cutting back on these entitlements? This would not change the demographic trend. There still will be millions of baby boomers moving into their mid to late 60s in the next 20 years. If their federal entitlements were curtailed, some baby boomers might try to delay their transition from “makers” to “takers”. [With apologies to Ms. Hortense Mintz, who drilled me and attempted to skill me in the writing of the English language at Manhattan Elementary School in Tampa, Florida, I am adopting the British convention regarding the placement of punctuation in relation to quotation marks because it seems more logical to me.] Others, who already have become “takers”, might transition back to “makers”.  But this is unlikely  to materially affect the large number of U.S. residents exiting the labor force because of age. So, there still is going to be a significant increase in the number of Americans, due to aging, consuming without producing in the next 20 years. If the federal government does not transfer funds from the cohort of “makers” to these senior “takers”, then the children of the senior “takers” or charities will provide funds to help feed, house, clothe and medicate them (me). This certainly would reduce the amount that senior “takers” consume, especially on discretionary goods and services, compared to what would have occurred if the government had not cut back on senior entitlements. For example, if Carnival Cruise Lines has problems now with its equipment breakdowns, just wait until senior “takers” ask their children for some extra cash so that they can take that winter Caribbean voyage! Regardless of who writes the check, in the next 20 years, there is going to be a substantial increase in the number of Americans who are consuming without producing. This is going to divert resources away from productivity enhancing uses, such as investment in physical and human capital. This, in turn, implies slower future real per-capita economic growth.

This slower future real per-capita economic growth that I expect was not inevitable had we saved for this demographic event. Had the private sector saved more, then the capital stock, both physical as well as human, would have grown faster. In turn, this would have enhanced future productivity growth and, thus, future real per capita economic growth. The advent of Social Security in 1935 and Medicare in 1965 created disincentives for American households to save for their consumption in retirement. Why should households save as much for their retirement when the government has promised to supplement their effective retirement income? If the government is going to supplement retiree income, then it is incumbent on the government to save more in anticipation of this. Had the government saved more, i.e., run surpluses or smaller deficits, this would have left more resources for use in building up the stock of physical and human capital. Had the nation as a whole saved more, then the U.S. economy might have been running trade surpluses with the rest of the world rather than persistent trade deficits. Cumulative trade surpluses would have allowed us to import more goods and services as “makers” transitioned into “takers”, permitting us to continue building up our capital stock so that future “makers” would be more productive. But, alas, as shown in Chart 3, the saving of combined government entities in the U.S. has been trending lower relative to GDP throughout the post-WWII era. Private saving relative to GDP has been trending lower since the mid 1980s. It is ironic that total net national saving as a percent of GDP peaked in 1965, the year in which the Medicare entitlement was signed into law.

Chart 3

 In sum, because we did not increase our aggregate saving in anticipation of the significant rise in the proportion of senior “takers” , real per capita economic growth in this country is likely to be adversely affected in the next 20 years. This does not mean that growth in our aggregate standard of living will be stagnant. But it does suggest that our per capita standard of living will grow slower than it has in most of the post-WWII era. Even if it were politically feasible to pare back entitlements to current senior recipients, this would have only marginal salutatory effects on the economy’s per capita real growth in the next two decades. Similar to the estimated 11 million undocumented “makers”, we baby-boom “takers” are here and we are not going away, voluntarily, at least. One way or another, we are going to eat and get medical care, which is going to use resources that otherwise could have been used to enhance the productivity of current and future “makers”.  There is no use crying over spilled milk. But we can take steps individually and, dare I say, collectively, to lower the probabilities of “spilling milk” for future generations. Those of us senior “takers” who are fortunate enough not to be destitute without our entitlements could voluntarily set up educational trust funds at Legacy Private Trust Company of Neenah, Wisconsin for our grandchildren, funding these trusts with our Social Security checks and/or with the funds we otherwise would have spent dining out or taking that annual Carnival Cruise. I have not looked at the data, but I doubt that there are enough senior “takers” in this financial position to make a significant impact in the aggregate. But for those that can set up these trusts, when you rest in peace you can also rest assured that your grandchildren will reflect fondly on you. Collectively, we can encourage our elected officials to enact policies that promote increased saving – both private and public – so that future generations of senior “takers” do not adversely affect growth in real per capita income when they transition from “makers”. Good luck with that!

Paul L. Kasriel

Senior Economic and Invest Adviser to Legacy Private Trust Company

Econtrarian, LLC

http://www.the-econtrarian.blogspot.com/

Econtrarian@gmail.com

1-920-818-0236